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Fink: The Foreign Policy Role of the President: Origins and Limitations

NOTES ON PRESIDENTIAL FOREIGN POLICY

POWERS
(PART II)

THE FOREIGN POLICY ROLE OF THE PRESIDENT:
ORIGINS AND LIMITATIONS
I.

INTRODUCTION

In the area of foreign affairs,' the Supreme Court has consistently allowed the President broad power by either upholding his ac-3
tions 2 or refusing to decide cases that raise a "political question."
1. The distinction between foreign and domestic affairs was emphasized in Zemel v.
Rusk, 381 U.S. 1 (1965); Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958); United States v. CurtissWright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936). The problem with this distinction is that the two
areas tend to merge, making it difficult to determine if an action should be labeled "domestic"
or "foreign." No criteria have been devised to help make this determination.
2. See, e.g., Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981); Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S.
280 (1981); United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942); United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S.
324 (1937); United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
The terms "Executive" and "President" will be used interchangeably throughout this
note. Whenever these terms are used, they refer to all officers of the executive branch.
3. In 1962, the Supreme Court purported to define the political question doctrine in
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962):
Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political question is found a
textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for
resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination
of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate
branches of government; or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; or the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious
pronouncements by various departments on one question.
Id. at 217.
For criticism and fuller explanation of the political question doctrine, see J. CHOPER,
JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS

(1980); Finkelstein, JudicialSelf-

Limitation, 37 HARV. L. REV. 338 (1924); Hughes, Civil Disobedience and the Political
Question Doctrine, 43 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (1968); Tigar, Judicial Power, the "PoliticalQuestion Doctrine," and Foreign Relations, 17 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1135 (1970); Note, Justiciability
and the Limits of PresidentialForeign Policy Power, I1 HOFSTRA L. REV. 517 (1982).
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As a result, history is replete with examples of presidents controlling
foreign policy.4 Politically, there may be strong reasons to afford
such vast power to the Executive.' Constitutionally, however, the

prescribed foreign affairs powers of the President are few.' He is
granted unilateral power only to "receive Ambassadors and other
public Ministers." 7
This seeming inconsistency between the broad power afforded
the President in foreign affairs by decisions of the Supreme Court
and the limited power expressly stated in the Constitution, has led to

confusion for those who try to define presidential power in the external sphere. It is necessary, therefore, to determine the basis upon

which the Court finds this broad power of the President. This note
discusses both the origins and limitations of the President's foreign
affairs powers. It should be noted that there are no strict guidelines
to delineate these powers. 8 The focus of this note is an analysis of
three theories that have attempted to do so.

The logical place to begin a search for the origin of presidential
powers is in the text of the Constitution. The first section of this note
is an overview of the powers enumerated in article I1,9 which refer to
the President's role in foreign affairs. 10 The purpose of this section is
to delineate the powers and limitations expressly provided the President in the Constitution.
The second section continues the inquiry-into the origin of presi4. See generally E. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT-OFFICE AND POWERS 1787-1957: HisTORY AND ANALYSIS OF PRACTICE AND OPINION (4th rev. ed. 1957) (discussing growth of
presidential power between years 1787 and 1957 and citing historical examples of same); Berger, The PresidentialMonopoly of Foreign Relations, 71 MICH. L. REv. 1 (1972) (discussing
constitutionality of claims of presidential monopoly in area of executive agreements through
use of historical analysis).
5. The Supreme Court observed that "the Executive is immediately privy to information
which cannot be swiftly presented to, evaluated by, and acted upon by the legislature." Zemel
v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 17 (1965).
6. The Constitution provides that "[t]he President shall be Commander in Chief of the
Army and Navy. . . . He shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties," U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 2, and also, subject to the advice and consent of
the Senate, to "appoint Ambassadors, other Public Ministers and Consuls," id., and "receive
Ambassadors and other Public Ministers," id. § 3.
7. Id.
8. According to Justice Jackson: "A judge, like an executive adviser, may be suprised at
the poverty of really useful and unambiguous authority applicable to concrete problems of
executive power as they actually present themselves." Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 634 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring in the judgment and opinion of the
Court).
9. U.S. CONST. art. II, § i, cl. i; id. §§ 2, 3.
10. See Infra notes 13-56 and accompanying text.
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dential authority through an analysis of three theories that have

evolved to define presidential power: the Express Constitutional Provision Theory, the Inherent Powers Theory, and the Implied Concurrent Powers Theory."' Each theory is discussed in terms of the
source of power, the limitations that define the scope of that power,
and the effect of the source and limitations on the doctrine of separation of powers. 2
II.

CONSTITUTIONAL EXECUTIVE POWER IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS:

AN OVERVIEW

Fearing a concentration of powers, the Framers of the Constitution were careful to divide the powers of the federal government
among three branches-legislative, executive, and judicial.13 The
Constitution, in three separate articles, grants each branch its powers: Article I establishes the Legislature,14 article II establishes the

Executive,15 and article III establishes the Judiciary.,
There are few express provisions in article II granting the President power in the area of foreign relations. The Constitution empowers the President to make treaties with the advice and consent of the
Senate, 17 to appoint 8 and receive ambassadors and other public ministers,1 9 and to assume command of the armed forces as Com11. These are recognized theories of presidential power, but they have not previously
been referred to by these titles. The titles are used for the purpose of convenience in this note.
12. The doctrine of separation of powers, which requires the government to be divided
into separate branches with separate powers, is one of two basic concepts underlying the structure of our constitutional democracy. The other concept is federalism, which postulates a division of power between the state and federal governments. This note is concerned only with
separation of powers within the federal government. It is taken as a given that, in the area of
foreign affairs, the states must defer to the federal government. See, e.g., Chae Chan Ping v.
United States, 130 U.S. 581, 606 (1889) ("For local interests the several States of the Union
exist, but for national purposes, embracing our relations with foreign nations, we are but one
people, one nation, one power."). For a discussion of the Framers' conception of separation of
powers, see Note, The Framers' Intent and the Early Years of the Republic, I I HOFSTRA L.
REv. 413, 423-28 (1982).

13. The Framers were strongly influenced by Montesquieu, who advocated the need for
separate branches. See THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 139 (J. Madison) (R. Fairfield ed. 1981)
(describing Montesquieu as the "oracle . . . always consulted and cited.").
14. See U.S. CONsT. art. I. In this note, article I will only be referred to for comparison
with and limitation of the presidential powers delegated in article II.
15. See id. art. II.
16. See id. art. III. For a discussion of the authority of the judiciary to determine the
power of the president in foreign affairs, see Note, supra note 3.
17. U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
18. Id.
19. Id. § 3.
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mander-in-Chief.2 0 According to Alexander Hamilton, however, the
enumerated powers of article II are only examples of the President's
vast "executive power."'2 ' Hamilton reached this conclusion by comparing the opening clause of article II, which states: "The executive
power shall be vested in a President of the United States of
America, 2 2 with the opening clause of article I, which delegates to
Congress "[a]ll legislative Powers herein granted.'2 3 Hamilton insisted that because the article II clause did not contain the restrictive
phrase "herein granted," the President was not restricted to the enumerated powers of the article.2 4 James Madison vehemently opposed
Hamilton's view and accused him of wanting to create a monarchy. 25
Debates on whether this clause confers power to the President or
merely designates the title of the Executive Office did not end with
the Framers.
In the early 1900's, Theodore Roosevelt advocated the view that
the opening clause of article II was a grant of power and not a mere
designation of title.26 Roosevelt called the President the "steward of
the people" whose "duty" was "to do anything that the needs of the
Nation demanded unless such action was forbidden by the Constitution or by the laws."' 27 Contrarily, President Taft, who was a sharp
critic of the "Stewardship Theory," stated "that the President can
exercise no power which cannot be fairly and reasonably traced to
some specific grant of power or justly implied and included within
such express grant as proper and necessary to its exercise.''28 Presently, a consensus has not been reached on the effect and meaning of
the opening clause of article II. Nonetheless, it is generally agreed
that the express provisions of the article give the President broad
power in the areas of negotiation and military control-areas that
are vital to policymaking in the foreign relations sphere. 9
20.

Id. § 2, cl.1.

21.

THE LETTERS OF PACIFICUS AND HELVIDIUS (1845) WITH THE LETTERS OF AMERI-

CANUS 10 (1845 & photo. reprint 1976) [hereinafter cited as PACIFICUS-HELVIDIUS LETTERS].
22. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl.1.
23. Id. art. I, § I (emphasis added).
24. PACFicus-HELVIDIUs LETrERs, supra note 21, at 10-11.
25. Id. at 53-64.
26. T. ROOSEVELT, THEODORE ROOSEVELT: AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY 357 (1924).
27. Id.
28. W. TAFT, THE PRESIDENT AND HIS POWERS 139-40 (1916).
29. See generally Berger, supra note 4 (discussing increase of presidential negotiation
through executive agreements); Fulbright, Congress, the President and the War Power, 25
ARK. L. REv. 71 (1971) (discussing increasing power of President in military matters);
Goldberg, The ConstitutionalLimitations on the President's Powers, 22 AM. U.L. REV. 667
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However broadly these powers may be interpreted, the text of
the Constitution does not allow for unilateral action by the President, except in receiving ambassadors and other public ministers.3 0
In treaty making and in the appointment of ambassadors, the President is subject to the "Advice and Consent" of the Senate. 3 ' This
limitation may give the impression that the Senate and the President
confer throughout the treaty making process. Since George Washington's administration, however, presidents have been reluctant to
consult with the Senate during treaty negotiation. 2
Notwithstanding this lack of prior consultation, the requirement
of the consent of two-thirds of the Senate 3 is a very real and powerful limitation on the President's negotiation power. The Senate may
employ this constitutional requirement of consent to impose conditions or reservations on the President or to approve or reject a treaty
outright. 34 Still, the President's power regarding treaties remains
broad, although limited by senatorial action. As Alexander Hamilton
wrote: "[T]reaties can only be made by the president and senate
jointly; but their activity may be continued or suspended by the president alone."3 5
The treaty procedure, with its requirement of senatorial consent,
has often been replaced by the executive agreement.3 6 The constitutional origin of executive agreements may be questionable,3 7 but,
(1973) (discussing centralization of power in Executive in areas of war and negotiation).
30. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
31. Id. § 2, cl. 2.
32. Early in his administration, President Washington attempted prior consultation with
the Senate. The result was chaos; the Senators debated the provisions of the proposed treaty,
questioned President Washington repeatedly and generally delayed ratification. For a more
complete account of this episode, see Note, supra note 12, at 459-62.
33. U.S. CoNsT. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
34. During the Senate's consideration of a test ban treaty, for example, President Kennedy promised, in a letter to the Senate, that a vigorous weapons program would be maintained despite the treaty and that the treaty would only be amended by treaty procedure, not
by executive action. The treaty was subsequently passed. Text of Kennedy Letter to Senators
on Atom Pact, N.Y. Times, Sept. 12, 1963, at 20, col. 3.
35.

PAclFIcus-HELVIDIus LErrERs, supra note 21, at 13.

36. See, e.g., Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981) (Supreme Court upheld
executive agreement freezing assets of American citizens during hostage negotiations with
Iran); United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942) (presidential agreement with Soviet Union
given weight of treaty and allowed to override conflicting state laws); United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324 (1937) (upholding executive agreement with Soviet Union and emphasizing implied power of President to make agreements unilaterally).
37. See Borchard, Shall the Executive Agreement Replace the Treaty?, 53 YALE L.J.
664 (1944); Mathews, The ConstitutionalPower of the President to Conclude International
Agreements, 64 YALE L.J. 345 (1955); Note, Executive Agreements: Beyond Constitutional
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having been accepted over the years, these agreements have now become commonplace.38 Even in this area, however, the President's
power is not without limit, because most agreements depend upon
congressional support.3 9
In the diplomatic arena, international agreements are only one
aspect of the President's negotiation powers. The President is empowered by the Constitution to "appoint Ambassadors, [and] other
public Ministers, ' 40 a power that increases the President's control of
foreign policy. As with treaties, the chief limitation upon the President's power of appointment is the constitutional provision requiring
the advice and consent of the Senate.' In practice, the Senate rarely
objects to the President's choices for diplomatic posts. As evidenced
by the instances when the Senate does object,' 2 however, the constitutional limitation is not ignored.
The President not only has the power to appoint United States
ambassadors, but is also empowered by the Constituton to receive
the ambassadors of other countries.'3 With this power, the President
can go so far as to recognize new governments without consulting
Congress." Congress, however, can always withhold appropriations
or pass resolutions 4 to enforce its will.
The exercise of powers seemingly broader than the express provisions of the Constitution is even more evident in the area of military control. The President is designated Commander-in-Chief of the
Limits?, 11 HOFSTRA L. REV. 805, 822-31 (1983).
38. See L. HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION 262 (1972); Mathews,
supra note 37, at 348; McDougal & Lans, Treaties and Congressional-Executive or Presidential Agreements: Interchangeable Instruments of National Policy: I, 54 YALE L.J. 181, 188-94
(1945).
39. When it becomes necessary to implement an executive agreement with government
funds, Congress gains the power to decide the fate of the agreement. The Constitution grants
Congress the power to raise funds in U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl.
1. The President has no such
power.
40. Id. art. II, § 2, cl.
2.
41. See supra text accompanying notes 30-35.
42. For example, President Wilson was unable to secure United States membership in
the League of Nations because of a lack of Senate support. For a discussion of this failure, see
A.

GEORGE &

J. GEORGE,

WOODROW WILSON & COLONEL HousE: A PERSONALITY STUDY

268-89 (1956).
43. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
44. For example, Richard Nixon appointed David E. K. Bruce as a "contact point" in
Peking, following his visit to China. Subsequently, George Bush was appointed by President
Ford to succeed Bruce. Both men helped to expand relations with China. See Shabecoff, Ford
Names Bush as Envoy to China to Succeed Bruce, N.Y. Times, Sept. 5, 1974, at 1, col. 8.
45. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8.
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armed forces. 46 The Constitution does not grant him any other warmaking powers. Instead, Congress is granted the power:
To declare War, grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal, and make
Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water;
To raise and support Armies...
To provide and maintain a Navy;
To make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and
naval Forces;
To provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the
Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions;
To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the Militia,
and for governing such Part of them as may be employed in the
Service of the United States. . . the Authority of training the Militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress."'
Even though the balance of constitutional war-making powers is

tilted toward Congress, the President has often taken the initiative in
military matters without prior congressional approval.4 8 At one time,

the Commander-in-Chief clause was considered to be the source of
authority for these measures.49
The scope of the Commander-in-Chief clause has never been
clearly defined by the courts. 50 The Framers had envisioned the
clause as a designation of the President as head general.5 1 In their
view, the President would carry out the policies determined by Congress pursuant to its constitutional powers. 2 Due to the exigencies of
46. Id. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
47. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 11-16.
48. An obvious example of presidential initiative in war-making is the Vietnam conflict.
See Indochina: The Constitutional Crisis(The Yale Paper), reprintedin 116 CONG. REc. 15,
409-16 (1970) (Part I); id. at 16,478-81 (1970) (Part II); Legality of United States Participation in the Viet Nam Conflict: A Symposium, 75 YALE L.J. 1084 (1966).
49. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952); Exparte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866); Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635 (1862); Fleming v. Page,
50 U.S. (9 How.) 603 (1850).
For a discussion of the constitutionality of the President acting on his own initiative under
the Commander-in-Chief clause, see Note, Congress, the President, and the Power to Commit
Forces to Combat, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1771 (1968); Lofgren, War-Making Under the Constitution: The Original Understanding,81 YALE L.J. 672 (1972).
50. For examples of instances in which the Court has attempted to define the scope of
the Commander-in-Chief clause, see cases cited supra note 49.
51. Alexander Hamilton noted the difference between the role of the President as the
head of the army and the role of the British King who could declare war. For a discussion of
Alexander Hamilton's views, see L. HENKIN, supra note 38, at 50-51. See also Note, supra
note 12, at 446.
52. See Reveley, ConstitutionalAllocation of the War Powers Between the President
and Congress: 1787-1788, 15 VA. J. INT'L L. 73, 130 (1974). See generally Sofaer, The Presi-
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war, the courts have allowed the President to use the Commanderin-Chief clause as a source of power, and have not restricted the
Executive to the Framers' narrow view. 53 The President, of course,
may use his visible position in foreign affairs in such a way as to
make war inevitable, leaving Congress with no real discretion in determining whether war should be declared.5 '
The separation of powers intended by the Framers5 5 has not
been preserved by the express provisions of the Constitution. The
President's actual power in foreign affairs is much broader than a
strict interpretation of the article II provisions would allow. The constitutional provisions, however, do offer limitations on presidential
power and keep the President from becoming the tyrant feared by
the Framers.56
III.

THREE THEORIES OF EXECUTIVE POWER IN FOREIGN
AFFAIRS

It is futile to search for specific guidelines to determine the
scope and breadth of executive power. Confronted by this problem in
a recent case, Justice Rehnquist noted that "decisions of the Court
in this area have been rare, episodic, and afford little precedential
value for subsequent cases."57 In view of this lack of case law, it may
be helpful for an understanding of when the President has the right
to act to look at three theories that attempt to determine the origin
of his power.
The first theory to be presented is the Express Constitutional
Provision Theory, which asserts that the President's powers are
strictly limited to the express provisions of the Constitution.5 8 The
dency, War, and Foreign Affairs: PracticeUnder the Framers,40

LAW &

CONTEMP. PROBS.,

Spring 1976, at 12 (discussing views of Framers regarding President's powers in war).
53. See supra notes 49, 52.
54. Edward Corwin stated that it "isthe ability of the President simply by his day-today conduct of our foreign relations to create situations from which escape except by the route
of war is difficult or impossible." E. CORWIN, supra note 4, at 226.
55. See Bestor, Separation of Powers in the Domain of Foreign Affairs: The Original
Intent of the Constitution Historically Examined, 5 SETON HALL L. REV. 529, 577 (1974);
Note, supra note 12, at 426-28.
56. As Justice Jackson said: "The purpose of the Constitution was not only to grant
power, but to keep it from getting out of hand." Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer,
343 U.S. 579, 640 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring in the judgment and opinion of the Court).
57. Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 661 (1981).
58. This view was advocated by the Framers. According to James Madison, the constitutional powers of the President are "few and defined." THE FEDERALIST No. 45, at 137 (J.
Madison) (R. Fairfield ed. 1981). The same position was taken by Justices Black and Douglas
in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952). Id. at 587-88; id. at 632-
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President cannot act unless that act is prescribed by a specific constitutional provision. The words of the Constitution are the origin and
limitation of the President's power. This theory does not allow for
overlapping among the branches of government--each branch has a
separate set of powers and a distinct role to play. 9 The brevity of
this analysis is due to the fact that this theory has no validity in light
of historical and present-day examples of presidential authority exercised outside the specific enumerated provisions.6 0 It is offered as a
basis for comparison with the other two theories and because it finds
support in early writings.
The antithesis of the Express Constitutional Provision Theory is
seen in the Inherent Powers Theory. According to this second theory,
the President's powers do not come from the Constitution. As a result, he is free to act without guidelines and with few limitations. 1
Unlike the Express Constitutional Provision Theory, legislative deference to executive action is acceptable under the Inherent Powers
Theory. 62 The President may exercise powers similar to those constitutionally granted to Congress because he is not limited to the provisions set forth in the Constitution. 3
The final theory to be explained will be the Implied Concurrent
Powers Theory, which takes the middle road between the preceding
theories. Contrary to the Inherent Powers Theory, this theory posits
that the Constitution is the only authority for presidential action.
Unlike the Express Constitutional Provision Theory, the Implied
33 (Douglas, J., concurring).
59. See Note, supra note 12, at 426-28.
60. According to Justice Jackson:
Some clauses could be made almost unworkable, as well as immutable, by refusal to

indulge some latitude of interpretation for changing times. I have heretofore, and do
now, give to the enumerated powers the scope and elasticity afforded by what seem

to be reasonable, practical implications instead of the rigidity dictated by a doctrinaire textualism.

Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 640 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring
in the judgment and opinion of the Court). See infra notes 118-55 and accompaning text.
61. The limitations on presidential power discussed in this note are constitutional limitations; the President, of course, may be limited by public opinion, through the press, the church,
political parties, labor unions, and other groups applying political pressure. For a discussion of
political limitations on presidential power, see E. HARGROVE, THE POWER OF THE MODERN
PRESIDENCY (1974); L. KOENIG, THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE (3d ed. 1975); A. SAYE, J. ALLUMS &
M. POUND, PRINCIPLES OF AMERICAN GOVERNMENT (8th ed. 1978).
62. In the Express Constitutional Theory, a strict adherence to the separation of powers
doctrine is demanded. See infra notes 65-73 and accompanying text.
63. See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 318 (1936); infra
notes 74-114 and accompanying text.
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Concurrent Powers Theory postulates that the text of the Constitution is susceptible to interpretation and the President may be allowed
to exercise power not specifically referred to in the document. Separation of powers, in this theory, takes on a different meaning than in
the Express Constitutional Provision Theory, where each branch held
different powers; here, foreign affairs powers are concurrent, but in
areas not specifically delegated to the President, Congress, by its leg64
islative authority, is supreme and may curtail presidential action.
All three theories are open to criticism and debate. There is no
unambiguous theory that will explain the President's powers in foreign affairs and establish criteria for his future action. Perhaps it is
because in dealing with other nations, preparation is tentative. Although history can be a guideline for future interactions, in the foreign relations sphere surprise is not uncommon. It is often difficult to
predict whether another country will act in such a manner as to require a response from our Chief Executive. The purpose of the following discussion of theories of presidential power is to provide, at
the very least, a loose framework from which to assess the actions of
the President.
A.

The Express Constitutional Provision Theory

The Express Constitutional Provision Theory, which allows the
President only those powers expressly granted by the Constitution,
has support in the writings of the Framers. James Madison wrote
that the executive power should be specifically defined.65 Governor
Randolph, speaking at the Virginia Ratification Convention in defense of the Constitution, said that the government's "powers are
enumerated. Is it not, then, fairly deducible, that it has no power but
what is expressly given it?-for if its powers were to be general, an
enumeration would be needless." 66 James Wilson was in accord with
Governor Randolph when he spoke of a "government consisting of
enumerated powers" at the Pennsylvania convention.67
These same men who stressed the need for adherence to the
enumerated powers, believed that to avoid the abuse of power, its
64.
65.

See infra notes 115-257 and accompanying text.
THE DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF

1787 WHICH

FRAMED THE CONSTI-

TUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 39 (G. Hunt & J.B. Scott eds. 1970).
66. 3 J. ELLIOT, THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOP-

TION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 464 (2d ed. 1941).
67. 2 Id. at 436.
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exercise must be divided between three branches of government.""
Each branch was thus restricted to the powers enumerated in its respective article. In 1952, Justices Black and Douglas reiterated this
view in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer.69 Both Justices
rejected the notion that the President could exercise legislative powers, because the Constitution explicitly grants all legislative powers
70

to Congress.

This inflexible view, advocating a strict adherence to the express
delegations of the Constitution, does not have any basis in historical
or present-day presidential actions. The President has often exercised
powers outside those expressly provided for by the Constitution, with
approval from the Court.71 One major reason that this theory has no
merit in practice is the ambiguity of many of the constitutional provisions. These provisions must often be interpreted by the Court to
determine their scope.7 2 They cannot be taken at face value.7 3
B. The Inherent Powers Theory
In direct opposition to the Express Constitutional Provision Theory is the Inherent Powers Theory, which does not depend upon the
specific provisions of the Constitution. This theory posits that the
President's power is inherent in his office and is not limited to his
68. This is the separation of powers doctrine. See supra note 12.
69. 343 U.S. 579 (1952) (plurality opinion). For Justice Black's plurality opinion, see id.
at 582-89; for Justice Douglas' opinion, see id. at 629-34 (Douglas, J., concurring). Three
Justices, though joining Justice Black's opinion, wrote separate opinions; two Justices wrote
separate concurring opinions. Id. at 593-667.
70. See id. at 588; id. at 630 (Douglas, J., concurring).
71. See, e.g., United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942) (President entered into agreement with Soviet Union without congressional approval); United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S.
324 (1937) (President, without congressional approval, recognized new government of Soviet
Union and entered into agreement that affected states rights); United States v. Curtiss-Wright
Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936) (President issued proclamation that made it illegal for
anyone to sell arms to warring factions of Chaco Region in South America). See infra notes
118-55 and accompanying text.
72. For examples of the Court interpreting the appointment power of the President, see
Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926) (President's power of appointment included power
of removal); Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935) (appointment power
interpreted further and removal power of President limited to Executive officers only).
For examples of the Court interpreting the treatymaking power of the President, see
United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324 (1937); Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920).
For examples of the Court interpreting the Commander-in-Chief clause, see Ex parte
Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866); Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635 (1862); Fleming v.
Page, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 602 (1850).
73. See Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 640 (Jackson, J., concurring in the judgment and opinion of the Court); supra note 60.
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few enumerated powers.7 4 The most comprehensive articulation of
the Inherent Powers Theory is found in the majority opinion of Jus75
tice Sutherland in United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.
This theory will be presented by discussion of Curtiss-Wright, because the analysis contained in the decision is so comprehensive and
so widely cited when presidential powers are in question.7 6
In 1936, President Franklin Roosevelt issued a Proclamation"
pursuant to a Joint Resolution of Congress,78 declaring an embargo
on the sale of arms to Paraguay and Bolivia. The Resolution had
given the President discretion to block the sale of arms to any of the
warring factions in the Chaco region of South America, if he determined that such a prohibition would help to bring peace.7 The defendant company, indicted for conspiring to sell arms to Bolivia,80
challenged the constitutionality of Congress' delegation of legislative
power to the President through the Joint Resolution.""
The boundaries of permissible delegation had been tested the

year before in A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States82
and Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan."s In both cases, the Court held
broad delegations unconstitutional," ostensibly because they allowed
74. According to Justice Sutherland: "[T]he powers of external sovereignty did not depend upon the affirmative grants of the Constitution." United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export
Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 318 (1936).
75. 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
76. See, e.g., Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 661 (1981) (questioning President's right to freeze claims of American nationals); Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 289, 291,
307 (1981) (questioning right of Secretary of State to revoke American citizen's passport);
United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 229 (1942) (questioning President's power to make international compact without Senate participation); United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 33132 (1937) (questioning President's power to make international compact without Senate
participation).
77. Proclamation No. 2087 (1934), reprintedin 48 Stat. 1744 (1934), repealed by Proclamation No. 2147 (1935), reprinted in 49 Stat. 3480 (1935).
78. H.R.J. Res. 347, ch. 365, 48 Stat. 811 (1934).
79. Id. (quoted in 299 U.S. at 312).
80. 299 U.S. at 311.
81. Id. at 314.
82. 295 U.S. 495 (1935) (concerning President's right to regulate poultry industry
through congressional delegation in National Industrial Recovery Act, ch. 90, 48 Stat. 195
(1933) (repealed 1935)).
83. 293 U.S. 388 (1935) (President attempted to prohibit interstate and foreign commerce transporation of petroleum and petroleum products in excess of amount prescribed by
certain provisions of National Industrial Recovery Act, ch. 90, 48 Stat. 195 (1933) (repealed
1935)).
84. See 295 U.S. at 537-38; 293 U.S. at 433. In Schechter, the challenged delegation
was promulgated under the "Live Poultry Code" of the National Industrial Recovery Act,
which stated:
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the President too much discretion without sufficient guidelines.8 5 Justice Sutherland circumvented this precedent by reasoning that the
delegated authority in the Curtiss-Wright situation had its effect in
the foreign relations sphere and, therefore, could not be judged by
the same standards as the cases involving domestic matters.86 Making this distinction, the Justice took the opportunity to espouse his
long held view of the origin of presidential powers in foreign
affairs.87
1. External Sovereignty as a Source of Power.-According to
CODES OF FAIR COMPETITION

Section 3(a). Upon the application to the President by one or more trade or industrial associations or groups, the President may approve a code or codes of fair competition for the trade or industry or subdivision thereof, represented by the applicant
or applicants, if the President finds (1) that such associations or groups impose no
inequitable restrictions on admission to membership therein and are truly representative of such trades or industries or subdivisions thereof, and (2) that such code or
codes are not designed to promote monopolies or to eliminate or oppress small enterprises and will not operate-to discriminate against them, and will tend to effectuate
the policy of this title...
.(d) Upon his own motion, or if complaint is made to the President that
abuses inimical to the public interest and contrary to the policy herein declared are
prevalent in any trade or industry or subdivision thereof, and if no code of fair
competition therefor has theretofore been approved by the President, the President,
after such public notice and hearing as he shall specify, may prescribe and approve
a code of fair competition for such trade or industry or subdivision thereof, which
shall have the same effect as a code of fair competition approved by the President
under subsection (a) of this section.
National Industrial Recovery Act, ch. 90, § 3(a), (d), 48 Stat. 195, 195-96 (1933) (repealed
1935).
The delegation challenged in Ryan stated:
Section 9(c). The President is authorized to prohibit the transportation in interstate
and foreign commerce of petroleum and the products thereof produced or withdrawn from storage in excess of the amount permitted to be produced or withdrawn
from storage by any state law or valid regulation or order prescribed thereunder, by
any board, commission, officer, or other duly authorized agency of a State ...
Id. § 9(c), 48 Stat. at 200.
85. However, prior to these decisions, broad delegations of power had been allowed. See
Hampton Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394 (1928); United States v. Grimaud, 220
U.S. 506 (1911); Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649 (1892).
The Court may have invalidated the delegations in Schechter and Panama Refining Co.
because of the lack of procedural safeguards noted by the Court. See Schechter, 295 U.S. at
533, 539-41; Panama Refining Co., 293 U.S. at 424-30.
86. See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 315-16 (1936).
87. Justice Sutherland had written his view of the federal government's sovereignty in
foreign affairs in a series of articles, before his tenure as Justice of the Supreme Court. See
generally G. SUTHERLAND, The Internal and External Powers of the National Government, S.
Doc. No. 417, 61st Cong., 2d Sess. (1909); G. SUTHERLAND, CONSTITUTIONAL POWER AND
WORLD AFFAIRS (1919).

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1983

13

Hofstra
Law
Review,
Vol. 11, Iss. 2 [1983], Art.
6
[Vol.
HOFSTRA
LAW
REVIEW

11:773

Justice Sutherland, the standards for delegation in the international
sphere are less stringent than those in the domestic sphere, because
the express enumerated powers of the Constitution only prescribe the
authority of the federal government in internal matters. 88 In external
affairs, the federal government was sovereign under the Articles of
Confederation. 9 The powers that stem from this sovereignty were
not changed by the Constitution, except where express terms qualify
their exercise.90
Commentators have criticized Justice Sutherland's external sovereignty theory on the basis of his erroneous use of historical facts. 91
Evidence has been produced to show that the Declaration of Independence created thirteen separate sovereigns and not, as Justice
Sutherland insisted, a Union with external sovereignty.9 2 Even scholars who claim that Justice Sutherland was correct in asserting the
sovereignty of the Union in international society, will not agree, however, that the federal government obtains its foreign affairs powers
only from this sovereignty.93 One critic, rebutting Justice Sutherland's statement that the Constitution does not speak to external
powers, points to a statement by James Madison that dispels the belief that the Framers did not include foreign affairs powers in the
Constitution.94 According to Madison: "The powers delegated by the
proposed Constitution to the federal government are few and defined
.. .[they] will be exercised principally on external objects, as war,
peace, negotiation, and foreign commerce." 95
2. The President as Sole Organ in International Relations.-Scholars also question the validity of Justice Sutherland's
statement that the exercise of power derived from external sovereignty is limited to the President.9" According to Justice Sutherland,
the complicated area of foreign affairs is best left to the President
because of the flexible nature of his office and its ability for secrecy
88. 299 U.S. at 315-16.
89. Id. at 317.

90. Id.
91. See, e.g., Berger, supra note 4, at 26-33; Levitan, The Foreign Relations Power: An
Analysis of Mr. Justice Sutherland's Theory, 55 YALE L.J. 467, 478-90 (1946); Lofgren,
United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corporation: An Historical Reassessment, 83 YALE
L.J. 1, 12-28 (1973).
92. See Berger, supra note 4, at 28-33; Levitan, supra note 91, at 478-90; Lofgren,
supra note 91, at 17-20.
93. See, e.g., L. HENKIN, supra note 38, at 22-27; Berger, supra note 4, at 28-33.
94. Berger, supra note 4, at 27.
95. THE FEDERALIST No. 45, supra note 58, at 137.
96. See, e.g., L. HENKIN, supra note 38, at 27-33; Berger, supra note 4, at 27-28.
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and caution.9 7 In describing the President's plenary power in this
field, the Justice borrowed a phrase from Chief Justice John Marshall, calling the President the "sole organ" of the federal government in the field of international relations."' When Chief Justice
Marshall referred to the "sole organ," however, he was not suggesting that the Executive had exclusive power to make policy in the
international arena. Instead, the President's power to extradite a foreign citizen pursuant to a treaty was at issue and Chief Justice Marshall was merely explaining why the President had a right to determine how to execute a treaty. 9 A look at the words following his
"sole organ" statement will show that Chief Justice Marshall believed the President's power could be superceded by Congress: "Congress, unquestionably, may prescribe the mode, and Congress may
devolve on others the whole execution of the contract; but, till this be
done, it seems the duty of the Executive department to execute the
contract by any means it possesses."' 100
3. Extra-ConstitutionalPower.-Even if it is conceded that
the flexible nature of the President's office makes the Executive the
appropriate branch to predominate in foreign affairs, there is no indication within the Constitution that power comes from an inherent
external sovereignty rather than from constitutional provisions.' 0'
According to one commentator, explicit in the tenth amendment,
which provides that "[t]he powers not delegated to the United States
by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved
to the States respectively, or to the people," 02 is the conception that
the federal government is one of enumerated powers only. 0 3 The
Framers had conceptualized a government with defined and limited
powers. 0 The Court itself has often reiterated that the government
5
is given its powers by the Constitution. 0
97. See 299 U.S. at 319.
98. Id. (quoting 10 ANNALS OF CONG. 613 (1800) (statement of J. Marshall)).
99. Under the Jay Treaty, President Adams had extradicted a British citizen charged
with murder by the British government. Adams' order surrendered the man without judicial
process. For a full account of the Jay Treaty, see J. CoMBs, THE JAY TREATY, POLITICAL
BATTLEGROUND OF THE FOUNDING FATHERS (1970).
100. 10 ANNALS OF CONG. 613 (1800).
101. Justice Sutherland had stated that power in foreign affairs "did not depend upon
the affirmative grants of the Constitution." 299 U.S. at 318.
102. U.S. CONsT. amend. X.
103. See L. HENKIN, supra note 38, at 24.
104. See supra notes 65-73 and accompanying text.
105. See Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 25 (1942); A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v.
United States, 295 U.S. 495, 528-29 (1935); Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wail.) 2, 139-40
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Justice Sutherland, however, did caution that the President's
plenary power was subject to limitation by constitutional provisions,
although the limitations were not explicitly prescribed.1 01 Critics of
his theory have noted the apparent inconsistency in advocating constitutional limitations for extra-constitutional authority. 107 They argue that if the provisions that limit power to one branch or the other,
such as the article I delegation of all lawmaking power to Congress,108 do not apply to international matters, then the prohibitions
that protect individual rights'1 may be ignored as well. 110 One
scholar suggests that such an extreme result of the extra-constitutional theory may be avoided by political pressure. 11 This scholar
does warn, however, that without legal boundaries, "the only substitute is the balance of political-and, ultimately, military-power in
the nation. 1 2 The constitutional democracy that our system is
based upon would be severely undercut if the President could act
without definable limitation.
Finally, it is important to note that the extra-constitutional argument in Curtiss-Wright does not have precedential value because
the outcome of the case did not depend upon this rationale.11 As a
(1866).
106. See 299 U.S. at 320.
107. According to Professor Ruhl J. Bartlett:
[T]he second part of this statement [Sutherland's warning that constitutional
limitations exist] cancels the first [that the President's power does not depend upon
the affirmative grants of the Constitution] because one of the most far-reaching and
applicable parts of the Constitution . . .is article I, § 8, which provides that the
Congress shall have power 'To make all Laws' . . . .It is often remarked that in
the interpretation of legal documents they must be examined as a whole and therefore that this provision of the Constitution must be considered in relation to all
other grants of power.
Transmittal of Executive Agreements to Congress: Hearings on S. 596 Before the Senate
ForeignRelations Committee, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess. 18 (1971) (statement of Professor Ruhl J.
Bartlett, Fletcher School of Law & Diplomacy, Tufts University, Medford, Mass.), reprinted
In I M. GLENNON & T. FRANCK, UNITED STATES FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW: DOCUMENTS
AND SOURCES 136 (1980).
108. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 1, cl.
1.
109. E.g., Id. amend. I-X.
110. See Winterton, The Concept of Extra-ConstitutionalExecutive Power in Domestic
Affairs, 7 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1 (1979); supra note 107.
111. Winterton, supra note 110, at 45.
112. Id.
113. According to Justice Jackson:
United States v. Curtiss-WrightCorp., 299 U.S. 304, involved, not the question of
the President's power to act without congressional authority, but the question of his
right to act under and in accord with an Act of Congress. The constitutionality of
the Act under which the President had proceeded was assailed on the ground that it
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result, subsequent cases have cited Curtiss-Wright merely as an ex114
ample of the constitutionality of broad delegations.
C. The Implied Concurrent Powers Theory
Of the three theories of presidential power discussed in this
note, only the Implied Concurrent Powers Theory allows the basic
ideals underlying our constitutional democracy to coexist with a flexible foreign relations field. Unlike the Express Constitutional Provision Theory, it recognizes that the enumerated powers of the Constitution may be given a broad interpretation when the situation
demands; unlike the Inherent Powers Theory, it protects our democracy by acknowledging the Constitution as the origin and limitation
of presidential power.
In order to obtain a comprehensive understanding of the Implied Concurrent Powers Theory, it is necessary to undertake a two
part analysis: first, a study of the potential source of implied powers,11 5 and second, a study of the permissible limits of presidential
legislation,116 as seen through an analysis of Youngstown Sheet &
Tube Co. v. Sawyer.11 7 The study of the potential source of implied
powers provides valuable background on where the courts have previously found implied power. The study using an analysis of Youngstown presents the constitutional and congressional limits on presidential "lawmaking" to show that the President's power may sometimes
be concurrent with Congess, but in areas not expressly delegated to
the President by the Constitution, Congress is supreme.
1. Implied Powers.--The President has been allowed, by the
Court's recognition of implied powers, broader authority than that
expressly delegated to him in the Constitution. Powers have been
implied from specific constitutional provisions,118 from statutory
delegations by Congress, 19 and from the silent acquiescence of
Congress. 2°
delegated legislative powers to the President. Much of the Court's opinion is

dictum ...
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635-36 n.2 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring in the judgment and opinion of the Court).
114.

See supra note 76.

115. See infra text accompanying notes 118-55.
116. See infra notes 156-257 and accompanying text.
117.

343 U.S. 579 (1952).

118.

See infra notes 121-30 and accompanying text.

119.

See infra notes 131-32 and accompanying text.

120. See infra notes 138-55 and accompanying text.
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Article II, section 2 of the Constitution provides the enumerated
powers of the President. 121 Powers may be implied from the specific
provisions of that section, as exemplified by Chief Justice Taft's
analysis in Myers v. United States.2 2 Speaking for the majority of
the Court, Chief Justice Taft upheld the right of the President to
remove an officer appointed by the President, despite the lack of a
grant of removal power from Congress.1 23 Although not specifically
delegated by the Constitution, the President's removal power was
deemed necessary for the execution of his constitutional power to
appoint officers. 24
In addition to the specifically enumerated powers of the President, article II contains two phrases that may be the constitutional
source that allows power to be implied where not specifically delegated. The first phrase, discussed earlier in this note,1 25 states: "The
executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United States
of America. '1 26 It seems that Chief Justice Taft relied on this phrase
in Myers, when he acknowledged the President's implied power to
remove officers. 127 The second phrase states that the President "shall
take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed. ' 28 Powers implied
under this phrase can be used to justify presidential authority derived from broad congressional statutory delegations 29 or congressional policy when Congress has not expressly stated its will. 30
Courts also have often inferred presidential power by construing
statutes to impliedly grant authority.13 ' Most cases where broad
power has been upheld concern foreign affairs.3 2 Broad interpreta121.
122.

U.S. CONST. art. II,
272 U.S. 52 (1926).

§ 2.

123. Id. at 119, 125.
124. Id. at 119.
125. See supra text accompanying notes 17-29.
126. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1.
127. Myers, 272 U.S. at 151, 161.
128. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
129. See infra text accompanying notes 131-32.
130. See infra text accompanying notes 138-55.
131. See, e.g., United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936) (ex-

ecutive proclamation making unlawful sale of arms to certain countries permissible in light of
historical delegation of power to President vis-a-vis foreign affairs); A.L.A. Schechter Poultry
Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935) (delegation of domestic legislative power to Presi-

dent would have been upheld if limitations had been placed on President's discretionary
power); Panama Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935) (delegation to President would have
been upheld if it had not been excessive).
132. See, e.g., Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981) (executive agreement
cutting off claims of United States citizens against foreign entities); Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S.
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tion of statutes will be readily applied in cases where the national
security is in danger and foreign affairs are affected. 3 3 According to
the Supreme Court:
[B]ecause of the changeable and explosive nature of contemporary
international relations, and tpe fact that the Executive is immediately privy to information which cannot be swiftly presented to,
evaluated by, and acted upon by the legislature, Congress-in giving the Executive authority over matters of foreign affairs-must
of necessity paint with a brush broader than that it customarily
wields in domestic areas."3
Additionally, the Court may allow broad delegation when constitutional rights of an individual are affected, if the Court determines that the individual has an alternative means of satisfying his
rights. For example, in Dames & Moore v. Regan,3 5 an executive
agreement that cut off claims of United States nationals against foreign entities in United States courts was upheld, even though there
was no specific congressional delegation authorizing such an act. 136
The Court noted that its decision was "buttressed by the fact that
the means chosen by the President to settle the claims of American
nationals provided an alternate forum, the Claims Tribunal, which is
1' 3 7
capable of providing meaningful relief.
Just as power may be implied from congressional action, it may
also be implied from congressional inaction. The courts will look for
an expression of congressional will, either in a statute, as discussed
above, or in the silent acquiescence of Congress. In United States v.
Midwest Oil Co., 38 the Court found that Congress' silent acquiescence had impliedly granted the President power to withdraw public
280 (1981) (revocation of passport); Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1 (1965) (refusal to validate
passport); United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936). Cf. AFL-CIO
v. Kahn, 618 F.2d 784 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 443 U.S. 915 (1979) (broad power condoned
in domestic situation; President permitted virtually unlimited power to set wage and price
controls by implying authority from two statutes).
In two cases, the Supreme Court, although holding specific congressional delegations of

power to the President to be unconstitutional, stated in dicta that broad delegations of domestic powers to the President could be constitutional if sufficient guidelines were prescribed.
A.L.A. Schecter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935); Panama Ref. Co. v.
Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935).
133. See supra note 132.
134. Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 17 (1965).
135. 453 U.S. 654 (1981).

136.

Id.at 678.

137.
138.

Id. at 686-87.
236 U.S. 459 (1915).
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land from private entry.139 Although there had been no statutory authority prescribing such withdrawal, over a peiod of many years the
Executive had made a practice of this and Congress had not enacted
any legislation to the contrary. 140 The Court held that Congress' silence may be taken as acquiescence, since Congress was aware of the
executive practice and, therefore, had the opportunity to put an end
to it, if it chose to do so. 4"

The Court, however, will not always defer to presidential authority when congressional action is absent. 42 In Kent v. Dulles,43
the Court disallowed an administrative policy, although Congress
had not specifically done S0.144 The focus of the Court's inquiry was
on the enforcement of the claimed power, rather than on congressional inaction. 4 5 According to the Kent Court:
Under the 1926 Act and its predecessor a large body of precedents grew up which repeat over and again that the issuance of
passports is "a discretionary act" on the part of the Secretary of
State. .

.

. This long-continued executive construction should be

enough, it is said, to warrant the inference that Congress had
adopted it. .

.

. But the key to that problem, as we shall see, is in

the manner in which the Secretary's discretion
was exercised, not
146
in the bare fact that he had discretion.
In 1981, the Court, in Haig v. Agee,147 qualified the holding in
Kent. The issue was the revocation of a passport of a citizen who had
admittedly tried to sabotage CIA activities in foreign nations. 48 Al139. Id. at 471.
140. Id. at 469-71.
141. Id. at 471-83.
142. See Infra notes 143-46 and accompanying text.
143. 357 U.S. 116 (1958).
144. Id. at 130. The Court had previously found congressional acquiescence where Congress was silent in the face of administrative policy. See, e.g., Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1
(1965) (disposition of public lands by Secretary of Interior pursuant to Executive Order); Norwegian Nitrogen Prods. Co. v. United States, 288 U.S. 294 (1933) (parties before Tariff Products Commission entitled to only limited opportunity to cross-examine adversary); Costanzo v.
Tillinghast, 287 U.S. 341 (1932) (administrative interpretation of deportation statute); United
States v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U.S. 459 (1915) (withdrawal by President of public lands from
private acquisition).
145. Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 127-28 (1958).
146. Id. at 124-25. It should be noted that the Court implied that had there been a
national emergency at this time, the case may have turned out differently. Id. at 128.
147. 453 U.S. 280 (1981). The dissenters in this case, Justices Brennan and Marshall,
felt the majority had done an injustice to Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958). 453 U.S. at
310-21 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
148. 453 U.S. at 283-85.
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though the Court did not find a long-standing practice of executive
enforcement of revocation, it upheld the Executive's right to do So. 149
The Court reasoned that there was no long-standing enforcement
practice because there were few instances of "serious damage to the
national security or foreign policy of the United States as a result of
a passport holder's activities abroad. . .. ,1,o5
According to the
Court, those few times when similar factual situations had arisen,
the Executive had withheld passports.151 Since Congress could have
acted to end this "'openly

asserted' .

.

. power at issue,"15 2 the

Court found Congress' inaction to be acquiescence. 1 3
The dissent in Haig intimated that the majority's holding was
influenced by the danger to our national security.'" Justice Brennan
wrote: "I suspect that this case is a prime example of the adage that
'bad facts make bad law.'

"155

More accurately, this case is a prime

example that the Court, unfortunately, is influenced by policy considerations when foreign affairs are at issue, leaving the question of
presidential authority to be answered on a case-by-case basis.
2. PresidentialLegislation-Constitutionaland Congressional
Limits.-To speak of the President having concurrent power with
Congress, is to imply that the President may exercise legislative powers. It is not unheard of for the President to legislate, 5 6 and although the Constitution expressly provides that Congress shall have
"All" legislative powers,157 presidential lawmaking has been held
constitutional in many cases. 158 The Supreme Court has not established a rule of law to determine the scope of this presidential legislative power, and what has occurred is an ad hoc case-by-case determination depending upon the situation at issue."'
Although specific guidelines to determine the breadth of presi149. Id. at 302.
150. Id.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.

Id.
Id. at 303 (quoting Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 9 (1965)).
453 U.S. at 303.
Id. at 310-21 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Id. at 319 (Brennan, J. dissenting).
See infra note 158.
U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 1, cl.
1.

158. Any time the President acts pursuant to broad delegations from congressional legislation or silent acquiescence, he is making law. See supra notes 132, 144.
159. According to Justice Jackson: "A judge . . . may be surprised at the poverty of
really useful and unambiguous authority applicable to concrete problems of executive power as
they actually present themselves." Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579,

634 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring in the judgment and opinion of the Court).
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dential power are unavailable, this section attempts to establish loose
guidelines through an analysis of Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v.
Sawyer.'60 Youngstown is often cited in the area of presidential powers, and very recently was acknowledged by the Supreme Court as
containing the best analysis of presidential power to date.161
During the Korean War, President Truman authorized the
seizure of domestic steel mills to prevent a strike that threatened to
arrest steel production. The steel companies affected by the takeover
sued to enjoin the Secretary of Commerce from enforcing the
seizure, claiming the executive order authorizing the Secretary's act
had no statutory or constitutional basis.162 The Government argued
that the President has an "inherent" power-as opposed to expressly
granted or implied power-to seize private property in an emergency
situation.163
The district court held that the President could only find power
in the provisions of the Constitution or in specific legislative
grants.164 Presiding Judge Pine stated that article II did not grant
the President emergency powers; quite the contrary, article I, section
8 of the Constitution expressly grants Congress the power to "'provide for the common defense and general welfare.' "65 Judge Pine
further distinguished all of the cases cited by the defendant in support of the inherent powers argument, on the basis that in each case
where power did not stem directly from the Constitution, there was a
statute from which it came.1 66 Apparently, Judge Pine was concerned about limits on emergency power, because he noted that Congress' article I, section 8 power was "within constitutional limitations."' 67 In Judge Pine's view, the United States government is one
of constitutionally limited powers.16 8 To the defendant's claim that,
in addition to inherent powers, there should be no judicial review of
the President's determination of an emergency, Judge Pine answered
that such a view is "alien to our Constitutional government of limited powers." 16
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.

343 U.S. 579 (1952).
Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 668-69 (1981).
Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 583.
See Id. at 584.
103 F. Supp. 569 (D.D.C.), af'd, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
Id. at 573-74 (quoting U.S. CoNsr. art. I, § 8).
Id. at 574-75.
Id. at 574.
Id. at 576.
Id. For an extensive discussion of judicial review of the President's actions in for-

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol11/iss2/6

22

Fink: The Foreign Policy Role of the President: Origins and Limitations
1983]

FOREIGN POLICY

The Supreme Court upheld the district court's decision by a
vote of six to three; five Justices wrote separate concurring opinions.1 70 Justice Black, as author of the plurality opinion, stated unequivocally that the President's authority to seize the steel mills
must come "either from an act of Congress or from the Constitution
itself.' 7 1 According to Justice Black, not only did the President
seize property without congressional authorization under the TaftHartley Act, 7 2 but Congress had discussed and rejected seizure
power as a method of solving labor disputes when it was drafting the
Act.

73

Justice Black's search for constitutional seizure authority proved
no more successful. Responding to the argument that authority may
be implied, he discussed constitutional provisions granting presidential power and could not find any basis for the President's executive
order. 7 4 Justice Black found no relevant authority in the Commander-in-Chief clause, 7 5 explaining that the theater of war concept
could not be expanded to include seizure of private property in order
to ensure production during war. 7 8 "This," he stressed, "is a job for
the Nation's lawmakers, not for its military authorities."' 77
Espousing a strict adherence to the separation of powers doctrine, 1 78 Justice Black rejected the argument that authority may be
implied from any of the constitutional provisions granting the President power. 77 These provisions, according to Justice Black, limit the
President's function in legislation to recommending and vetoing
laws.' 80 He concluded that, as Congress has exclusive constitutional
power to make laws, the President had overstepped his constitutional
eign affairs, see Note, supra note 3.
170. See 343 U.S. at 593-667. Justices Frankfurter, Jackson, and Burton, though writing separate opinions, joined Justice Black's plurality opinion, id. at 589. Id. at 593 (Frankfurter, J., concurring); id. at 634 (Jackson, J., concurring in the judgment and opinion of the
Court); id. at 655 (Burton, J., concurring in both the opinion and judgment of the Court).
171. Id. at 585.
172. The Labor Management Relations Act, ch. 120, 61 Stat. 136 (1947) (current version at 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-187 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980)).

173.
45 (1947).
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.

343 U.S. at 586. For Congress' discussions on this issue, see 93 CoNG. Rac. 3637See 343 U.S. at 587-89.
U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
343 U.S. at 587.
Id.
For a discussion of separation of powers, see supra note 12.
See 343 U.S. at 587-88.
Id. at 587.
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bounds by authorizing the seizure of the mills.181
Edward S. Corwin, a noted authority on presidential powers,
has pointed out that strict adherence to separation of powers would
have precluded the Court from ending the seizure, because termination was within Congress' power. 182 In declaring the seizure illegal,
the Court usurped congressional power, just as Justice Black claimed
the President had done. 8 3 Scholars have also noted that Justice
Black did not support his opinion with precedent from previous decisions or governmental practice.184
Justice Frankfurter concurred in Justice Black's separation of
powers argument on the facts of Youngstown, but stated that this
doctrine is more flexible than Justice Black allowed. 185 Justice
Frankfurter was careful not to commit himself to a comprehensive
delineation of presidential powers. He noted that it was irrelevant to
consider what powers the President would have had if there had
been no legislation or if the seizure had been temporary. 86 Looking
to prior congressional enactments granting the President seizure
power, Justice Frankfurter demonstrated that Congress was careful
to draw strict guidelines to circumscribe this power. 87 Justice
Frankfurter then pointed to the legislative history of the Labor Management Relations Act 88 to show that Congress had considered and
rejected seizure as a method of solving labor disputes.189 Noting that
the President would not have had seizure power if Congress had expressly negated it in legislation, Justice Frankfurter opined that Congress had, nevertheless, expressed its intent in this area.190 In reply
to the Government's argument that the conflict in Korea created a
need for the President to seize the mills, 191 Justice Frankfurter
stated:
Absence of authority in the President to deal with a crisis does not
imply want of power in the Government. Conversely the fact that
181.
182.
REV. 53,
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
(1947).
190.
191.

See id. at 588-89.
Corwin, The Steel Seizure Case: A JudicialBrick Without Straw, 53 COLUM. L.
62 (1953).
See 343 U.S. at 588.
See, e.g., Corwin, supra note 182, at 56.
343 U.S. at 589 (Frankfurter, J., joining in the opinion of the Court).
Id. at 597 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
See id. at 598 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
See supra note 172.
See 343 U.S. at 598-602 (Frankfurter, J., concurring); 93 CoNG. REc. 3637-45
343 U.S. at 602 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
See id. at 603 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
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power exists in the Government does not vest it in the President.
The need for new legislation
does not enact it. Nor does it repeal or
192
amend existing law.
According to Justice Frankfurter, to find authority where it has been
"so explicitly withheld. . . is to disrespect the whole legislative process and the constitutional division of authority between President
and Congress."' 93
To explain the nature of the authority granted the President by
article II, section 3, which provides that "he shall take Care that the
Laws be faithfully executed, 194 Justice Frankfurter quoted Justice
Holmes: "'The duty of the President to see that the laws be executed is a duty that does not go beyond the laws or require him to
achieve more than Congress sees fit to leave within his power.' 9195
Justice Black had conceived this clause as precluding the President's
exercise of any legislative powers; 196 the Holmes quote merely emphasizes congressional limitations.
Citing United States v. Midwest Oil Co.,197 Justice Frankfurter
noted that a long-continued executive practice that had not been opposed by Congress, although within its knowledge, was an implied
grant of authority to the President. 19 8
Justice Douglas concurred in Justice Black's separation of powers argument, placing great emphasis on the "All" in article II, section 1, which grants Congress the legislative powers vested in the
Constitution. 9 He stated that the President's seizure was an unlawful exercise of legislative power.200 Further, according to Justice
Douglas, the condemnation provision of the fifth amendment, 20 1
20 2
which requires compensation when the government takes property,
had an important bearing on the case. He reasoned that because
192. Id. at 603-04 (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring).
193. Id. at 609 (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring).
194. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
195. 343 U.S. at 610 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (quoting Myers v. United States, 272
U.S. 52, 177 (1926)).
196. See 343 U.S. at 587-89.
197. 236 U.S. 459 (1915).
198. See 343 U.S. at 610-11 (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring). For more on implied powers,
see supra notes 118-55 and accompanying text.
199. See 343 U.S. at 630 (Douglas, J.,
concurring).
200. Id. at 633 (Douglas, J., concurring).
201. "No person shall be ... deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation." U.S.
CONsT. amend. V.

202.

343 U.S. at 631-32 (Douglas, J.,
concurring).
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Congress has the constitutional power to raise revenues, "[the
branch of government that has the power to pay compensation for a
seizure is the only one able to authorize a seizure or make lawful one
that the President had effected."203
Edward S. Corwin suggested that Justice Douglas' analysis of
compensation power overlooks cases where the right of compensation
for the taking of property was upheld although the taking was based
on the constitutional powers of the President. 04 Justice Douglas'
analysis is also inconsistent with an earlier opinion of his where he
quoted from the Federalist: "All constitutional acts of power,
whether in the executive or in the judicial department, have as much
legal validity
and obligation as if they proceeded from the
20 5
legislature."
Justice Burton, though joining Justice Black's plurality opinion,
stated separately that because Congress had prescribed specific procedures for the President to meet the emergency in this case and had
reserved to itself the power to seize, the President had invaded Congress' "jurisdiction."2 0° It is not clear whether Justice Burton meant
to use the word "jurisdiction" in its strict sense to mean that seizure
was solely within Congress' area of authority or whether he used it
figuratively for want of a better word. If used in its strict sense, then
there appears to be an inconsistency in the Justice's opinion, because
he acknowledged that if Congress had not prepared for such 2an
07
emergency, the President would have been able to act on his own.
Justice Clark acknowledged that in times of grave emergency,
the President may have independent power to act. 08 He qualified
this power, however, by stressing that if Congress has outlined the
specific procedures to handle the emergency, the President must
comply with the congressional mandate. 20 9 According to Justice
Clark, three statutory procedures were available to the President: the
Defense Production Act of 1950,210 the Labor Management Rela203.
204.
205.
at 190 (J.
206.
Court).
207.
Court).
208.
209.
210.

Id. (footnote omitted) (Douglas, J.,
concurring).
Corwin, supra note 182, at 63.
United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 230 (1942) (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 64,
Madison) (R. Fairfield ed. 1981)). See Corwin, supra note 182, at 63.
343 U.S. at 660 (Burton, J.,concurring in both the opinion and judgment of the
See Id. at 659 (Burton, J.,concurring in both the opinion and judgment of the
Id. at 662 (Clark, J.,
concurring).
Id. (Clark, J.,
concurring).
Act of Sept. 8, 1950, ch. 932, 64 Stat. 798 (1950).
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tions Act,2 1 ' and the Selective Service Act of 1948.212 The first two

Acts did not authorize seizure in this type of situation and the Selective Service Act was not invoked.213
Justice Jackson, in a separate opinion, joined Justice Black's
plurality opinion. He chose to analyze presidential authority through
three types of interaction between the branches of the federal government. In the first situation, the President acts pursuant to an express or implied authorization from Congress and his power is at its
strongest.214 According to Justice Jackson, if the President's act is
declared unconstitutional, it would usually mean that the federal
government as a whole lacks authority.215 Conversely, in the second
situation, the President acts against the express or implied will of
Congress and "his power is at its lowest ebb."2 6 To uphold the President's authority in this context would be to usurp that of Congress. Justice Jackson warned that caution must be used here, "for
what is at stake is the equilibrium established by our constitutional
system. 217
The third situation, where the President acts in the absence of
either a congressional grant or denial of authority, 218 is not as easily
dispensed with. According to Justice Jackson's analysis, in addition
to relying on his own independent powers, the President may enter a
"zone of twilight" where his power is concurrent with Congress or
the distribution of authority between the branches is uncertain. 2 9 In
this "zone of twilight," the test of presidential power, at least in regard to the separation of powers problem,220 turns on the intent of
Congress, as seen through "congressional inertia, indifference or quiescence. "221 In Justice Jackson's view, "any actual test of power is

likely to depend on the imperatives of events and contemporary im211.

Act of June 23, 1947, ch. 120, 61 Stat. 136 (1947) (current version at 29 U.S.C.

§§ 141-187 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980)).
212. 343 U.S. at 663 (Clark, J., concurring). For the text of the Selective Service Act of
1948, see Act of June 24, 1948, ch. 625, 62 Stat. 604 (1948) (current version at 50 U.S.C.
app. §§ 451-473 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980)).

213.
214.
215.
216.

See 343 U.S. at 665-66 (Clark, J., concurring).
Id. at 635 (Jackson, J., concurring in the judgment and opinion of the Court).
Id. at 636-37 (Jackson, J., concurring in the judgment and opinion of the Court).
Id. at 637 (Jackson, J., concurring in the judgment and opinion of the Court).

217.

Id. at 637-38 (Jackson, J., concurring in the judgment and opinion of the Court).

218. Id. at 637 (Jackson, J., concurring in the judgment and opinion of the Court).
219.

Id. (Jackson, J., concurring in the judgment and opinion of the Court).

220.

See supra note 12.

221.

343 U.S. at 637 (Jackson, J., concurring in the judgment and opinion of the

Court).
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'
ponderables rather than on abstract theories of law."222
As noted previously, the Supreme Court has recently acknowledged the usefulness of Justice Jackson's classifications for analytical
purposes. 23 The Court warned, however, that executive action will
not always fall neatly into any one category.224 Justice Jackson, in
acknowledged that they were an
introducing his classifications,
"over-simplified grouping, ' '22 although he found it very easy to pigeonhole the seizure into the second category, where the President
acts contrary to express or implied congressional intent.22
Noting the severity of the test that determines whether presidential actions should be upheld under his second classification, Justice Jackson proceeded to look for authority under article II providi not find power authorized by the broad executive
* 227
He did
sions.
228
clause, which provides: "The executive Power shall be vested in a
President of the United States of America.11229 He could not fathom
why certain powers would thereafter be enumerated, leaving others
merely to be implied by this provision. Justice Jackson stated that
the executive clause was limited to "an allocation to the presidential
office of the generic powers thereafter stated. 23 1
In discussing the Commander-in-Chief clause,232 Justice Jackson refused to concede that a President could turn his largely uncontrolled foreign affairs powers into power over internal affairs through
his own commitment of armed forces to a foreign nation. 3 3
Justice Jackson also could not find seizure power in the clause
authorizing the President to "take Care that the Laws be faithfully

222.
223.
nying note
224.
225.
Court).
226.
Court).
227.
Court).
228.
229.
230.
Court).
231.
232.
233.
Court).

Id. (Jackson, J.,concurring in the judgment and opinion of the Court).
Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 668-69 (1981); see supra text accompa161.
Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 668-69 (1981).
343 U.S. at 635 (Jackson, J.,concurring in the judgment and opinion of the
See Id. at 638-40 (Jackson, J.,concurring in the judgment and opinion of the
See id. at 640-41 (Jackson, J.,concurring in the judgment and opinion of the
See id. at 641 (Jackson, J.,concurring in the judgment and opinion of the Court).
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, c. 1.
343 U.S. at 640-41 (Jackson, J.,concurring in the judgment and opinion of the
Id. at 641 (Jackson, J.,concurring in the judgment and opinion of the Court).
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, ci. 1.
343 U.S. at 642 (Jackson, J., concurring in the judgment and opinion of the
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executed. '23 4 According to Justice Jackson, this "authority must be
matched against words of the Fifth Amendment that 'No person
shall be. . . deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process
of law.' "235 In regard to these clauses, Justice Jackson stated:
One gives a governmental authority that reaches so far as there is
law, the other gives a private right that authority shall go no farther. These signify about all there is of the principle that ours is a
government of laws, not of38men, and that we submit ourselves to
rulers only if under rules.1
Lastly, Justice Jackson looked to the argument that seizure
power has accrued to the executive office because other presidents
have used this as an emergency measure. 37 He rejected this inherent
emergency power; first, because he could distinguish previous seizure
cases,238 and second, because the Constitution makes no provision for
extraordinary authority of the Executive in terms of crisis.2 39 According to Justice Jackson, only Congress can grant the President
emergency powers, in order to ensure restraint upon his authority.240
a. Reconciliation of the Opinions.-Although agreeing that
the President was without authority to seize the steel mills, the Justices voting to uphold the district court were in harmony on only a
few points respecting the constitutional powers of the President. All
agreed that the President's powers in any area must be based on
grants of authority under article 11.241 There was not, however, a
consensus on whether the opening sentence of section one of article
II, which vests executive power in the President, 242 is itself a grant of
power or simply a designation of title to the Chief Executive. While
Justice Jackson expressly stated that this clause was not a grant of
234.

U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.

235. 343 U.S. at 646 (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. V) (Jackson, J., concurring in the
judgment and opinion of the Court).
236. Id. (Jackson, J., concurring in the judgment and opinion of the Court).
237. See id. at 646-49 (Jackson, J., concurring in the judgment and opinion of the
Court).
238. See id. at 648-49 & n.17 (Jackson, J., concurring in the judgment and opinion of
the Court).
239. See id. at 643-46, 649-51 (Jackson, J., concurring in the judgment and opinion of
the Court).
240. See id. (Jackson, J., concurring in the judgment and opinion of the Court).
241. See id. at 587 (Black, J., plurality opinion); id. at 610 (Frankfurter, J., concurring); id. at 632 (Douglas, J., concurring); id. at 640 (Jackson, J., concurring in the judgment
and opinion of the Court); id. at 659 (Burton, J., concurring in both the opinion and judgment
of the Court); id. at 662 (Clark, J., concurring in the judgment of the Court).
242. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl.
1.
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power, 243 Justice Frankfurter implied tha't this clause, in combination with section three regarding the duty to enforce the laws, could
2"
be considered as both a grant of power and a designation of title.
As a corollary to the consensus that authority of the President
must be justified by article II grants of power,245 the Justices seem to
agree that the President is always subject to constitutional limitations.246 They agree, as well, that by virtue of its legislative powers,
Congress has the paramount authority to establish procedures to be
followed in an emergency of this type.2 4 As a result, whatever authority the President has is also subject to congressional limitations.
Congress, therefore, has preemptory powers over the Executive.
Justices Jackson, Frankfurter, Clark and Burton seem to be advocating the Implied Concurrent Powers Theory of presidential powers in foreign affairs.2 8 Justices Black and Douglas present a very
strict view of the separation of powers doctrine, and it would be difficult to maintain that they adhere to this theory of implied concurrent powers.
The Implied Concurrent Powers Theory, apparently advocated
by four of the six Justices voting to uphold the district court in
Youngstown, is in accord with the concept of a constitutional democracy, so far as it relies upon the Constitution as the source of presidential power.2 4 9 Power is implied from congressional policy 250 or, in
the absence of such policy, from the specific provisions of the Constitution.2 51 Congressional limitation of presidential action is evident in
the text of the Constitution. The President's powers under the Com243. See supra text accompanying notes 214-40.
244. See supra text accompanying notes 185-98.
245. See supra note 241.
246. These limitations include the article I delegation of power to Congress, U.S.
CoNsT. art. I, § 1, cl. 1. See supra note 241.
247. See 343 U.S. at 587-89 (Black, J., plurality opinion); id. at 610-14 (Frankfurter,
J., concurring); id. at 630-34 (Douglas, J., concurring); id. at 654-55 (Jackson, J., concurring
in the judgment and opinion of the Court); id. at 656 (Burton, J., concurring in both the
opinion and judgment of the Court); id. at 662 (Clark, J., concurring in the judgment of the
Court).
248. See supra text accompanying notes 118-55.
249. The need to adhere to the Constitution was emphasized by each of the six Justices.
See 343 U.S. at 585 (Black, J., plurality opinion); id. at 610 (Frankfurter, J., concurring); id.
at 630 (Douglas, J., concurring); id. at 640 (Jackson, J., concurring in the judgment and
opinion of the Court); id. at 659 (Burton, J., concurring in both the opinion and judgment of
the Court); id. at 662 (Clark, J., concurring in the judgment of the Court).
250. See supra text accompanying notes 118-55.
251. See supra text accompanying notes 118-30.
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mander-in-Chief clause 25 2 are limited by the vast war-making power
granted to Congress in article 1.253 Similarly, in article II, the Constitution imposes a requirement of senatorial advice and consent
upon the President's power to make treaties and appoint federal officers or ambassadors. 54 Finally, the Constitution contemplates Executive accountability to Congress in the article II, section 3 provision that the President "shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully
executed, n 5 while Congress is granted "All" lawmaking powers.256
As far as the concurrent powers are concerned, it is in this area
that the Implied Concurrent Powers Theory comes dangerously close
to impinging upon the concept of a constitutional democracy. Presidential legislation, even in the absence of congressional policy, poses
a serious threat to the doctrine of separation of powers, which the
Constitution is based on.257
In addition to the problem of overlapping branches, the Implied
Concurrent Powers Theory does not provide clear guidelines for
judging future presidential actions. How broadly the provisions of
the Constitution or congressional policy may be interpreted, is left to
the factual situation at issue.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Executive acts must be performed within the boundaries prescribed by the Constitution. The chief constitutional limitation on
executive power in foreign affairs is the dominant lawmaking role
granted to Congress. Guidelines for the future exercise of presidential power should be created by legislation. If enactment of responsive legislation is made impossible by the circumstances of an unpredictable foreign relations situation, however, it will be the courts'
duty to determine the constitutional validity of any action taken by
the President. When making such a judgment, the court must first
consider whether or not Congress has provided for such presidential
action. If congressional expression is absent, the court must look to
the specific prohibitions of the Constitution to determine if the President's act has denied any rights of the states or the people.
Of all the theories discussed in this note, only the Implied Con252.

253.
254.
255.
256.
257.

CONST. art. II, § 2, ci. 1.
See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
U.S. CONsT. art. I1,
§ 2, cl.
2.
Id. § 3.
Id. art. 1, § 1. Cf. Corwin, supra note 182, at 57.
See supra note 12.

U.S.
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current Powers Theory allows for the flexibility necessary in foreign
relations while still adhering to the confines of the Constitution. Unfortunately, there are no strict guidelines for the courts or executive
advisers to follow; that is the nature of foreign affairs. Nonetheless,
the common thread for all such decisions must be the Constitution.
Jody S. Fink
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